AES Encryption Modes
Discussions critique insecure uses of AES in modes like CBC without authentication, compare to GCM or CTR, and highlight vulnerabilities like nonce reuse, known-plaintext attacks, and padding oracles.
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Doesn't this make your key susceptible to known-plaintext attacks?
CBC mode isn't exactly a saving grace here, since it's unauthenticated.
That's just encryption with a one-time pad, nothing new...
Doesn't this depend on the mode of operation/block chaining? Or is it an issue regardless?
It doesn't use CBC mode or dynamically pick key sizes, so it can't be.
The AES block cipher core: also grievously insecure if used naively, without understanding what a block cipher can and can't do, by itself. Thus also an LLM call.
Why did you use CBC? It's actually harder than crypto/cipher.AEAD, and what you're doing now seems insecure.
Might need to read up on modern ciphers. They are protected against this kind of attack.
Yes, look at Rogaway's license for OCB mode.
If the attacker never gets a hold of a plaintext-ciphertext pair, how well does AES-GCM with nonce reuse hold up?