737 MAX MCAS Sensors

This is a hardware issue. Lack of redundancy in sensors. Lack of knobs to turn MCAS off without turning off the electric motors that are apparently necessary to control the plane in challenging circumstances (which a hardware failure can put you in).It's also a training issue, especially with the first flight pilots not being informed about this system.Maybe it can be worked around via software changes and human training. But the software appears to have done what it was supposed to.

It's worse than this. MCAS is designed to only look at one of the two AoA sensors. If this happens to be faulty, it doesn't know, because it's not comparing the sensor to the other one. Instead of a system which can notice and account for disagreeing sensors and fail gracefully, we have a system which is a designed single point of failure and fails... lethally.

Well if you mean MCAS, then coding was not a main issue, but the fact that system expected 2 sensors to deduce malfunction while management decided to put there only 1 sensor and 2 only as a premium. Then MCAS system had no way how to deduce if 1 input sensor is sending correct data or garbage.

I think it was a systems issue with the software a part of it. From what I read, the software system is archaic in a bad way since you have duplicate systems but not used for redundancy. Only one set is used at a time and which one is switched with every boot.It had two pitch sensors but each is paired with a single computer. There was an optional add on to use both sensors in some way but this is unreliable as well since you don’t know which is right. It was when the plane was flying with th

Did you forget why the 737 max had 2 crashs ? The alert of the difference between 2 sensors didn't work / wasn't there. So the system was relying on 1 sensor.

It's worse than other such planes. For instance, the accident on Qantas Flight 72 is superficially similar - faulty data caused the Airbus A330's flight computer to ignore pilot input and abruptly pitch down, injuring a number of passengers - but it really wasn't. The Airbus engineers knew that angle-of-attack sensors fail, so unlike Boeing they designed their system to compare the input from multiple AOA sensors and ignore bogus data.Unfortunately, that comparison algorithm ha

The main bug was:* each flight computer used its own angle of attack sensor with no way to detect failure. Craft had 2 sensors, but they were not used together (apparently that was extra paid option...) * pilots didn't know how the system worked or when it is active, so they were fighting against itdon't remember anything about overflow

It's not a software issue because the software was working excatly as specified. There is no bug.And its not really an aerodynamic issue either.Boeing have a massive procedural issue where they didn't do proper safety analysis of how the system works as a whole. The fact that they didn't identify this failure case as a major issue makes you wonder what other failure cases (on other planes too) that they missed.The original version of MCAS only moved the stablizer by 0.6 d

Three AoA sensors is still not enough to generate a confident consensus to allow an autopilot system capable of crashing the plane to functionOn Lufthansa 1829, two of the three AOA sensors on an A321 erroneously agreed, causing a system similar to MCAS to kick in[1]The sensors can fail due to being frozen, or also be damaged by birds traveling in flocks[1] Third bullet point under the A321 heading: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_accidents_and_inciden

the airframe was fine. the problem was that mcas was implemented in a totally shitty way. If it had just replied on 3 sensors instead of 1, wet likely wouldn't be talking about it now.