Tor Anonymity Limitations
The cluster discusses Tor's privacy and anonymity features, including risks from traffic analysis, exit nodes, relays, and bridges, as well as limitations in hiding Tor usage and protecting against advanced attacks.
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Any word on the implications for the anonymity of Tor clients?
How does running a Tor relay compromise your privacy?
Could you expand? How does using tor makes you stick out like a sore thumb?
This uses Tor's hidden services. The project page says each client makes 3 "random hops" and meet in the middle to create a secure tunnel. The communications never leave the Tor network so, I could be wrong, but I don't think traffic analysis applies here.
At least spiritually not if the traffic is routed over a Tor circuit. :-)
Tor has alternative transports (bridges) that are meant to disguise the use of Tor on the local network, they should help with the obviousness issue.
Tor is far from perfect and there are several ways in which one could connect traffic at some endpoint with a user at a specific IP. Do not rely on Tor if you really want anonymity.
Around 100% for anyone using the normal Tor browser bundle.Tor is designed to hide who you are talking to, not the fact that you are using Tor. IPs and other metadata about normal Tor relays are published publicly by the network and are used by the client to build circuits through the network.There is a special form of hidden entry node called a bridge that is designed for use in censorship-happy countries like China, but using them is a manual process that isn't the default. Traffic
Does it do onion routing like Tor? Does it protect from traffic correlation or timing attacks?
Data between you and tor nodes are encrypted, no way your idea will work.