Verifiable Secret Voting
The cluster focuses on debates about designing voting systems that allow individuals to verify their votes were counted correctly while preserving anonymity to prevent coercion, vote buying, and intimidation, with discussions of methods like Scantegrity, serial numbers, and zero-knowledge proofs.
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To protect voting, use this or something similar:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scantegrity
Please explain? It's not currently technically possible to provide proof that you voted for a specific person and thus making it impossible to buy votes.The fact that you cannot personally verify whether your vote gets counted is a feature, not a bug.
If you take the time to enter the voting booth when it opens and verify that the ballot boxes are empty at the start, and stay in the voting booth until it closes, you can verify yourself if everyone put at most one ballot in the ballot box. Later on you can double check if indeed every ballot is counted correctly and can thus conclude that at least your own ballot is counted correctly and exactly once without having to let anyone know what you voted.
Is there any solution where I can verify my vote, but someone can't coerce me into showing them?
serious question, how do you know your vote is counted and is not intercepted/counterfeited before that?
It means that some people will be able to force others to vote a certain way, punish them if they don't vote a certain way, or even pay them for their votes. Those schemes are a lot less effective when you can't prove how someone voted. People can try to bribe you, or even intimidate you, but once you're in the voting booth you have the freedom to vote however you want and nobody can find out later which way you actually voted. That freedom is very important and worth keeping. You
What do you do when you know the vote counter and don't trust them?
It's not about showing how you apparently voted, it's about not being able to prove it.You can record a picture of a ballot and then spoil it and things like that.
Run out of pencils, voter makes mark on both candidates (check on one, x on other), counter decides to drop a bunch of additional ballots in, your vote is visible to the outside so the person who paid you to vote a certain way can verify.Voting is a hard problem.
Your solution is worse than the problem. Votes are confidential for a reason--to prevent voter intimidation, vote swapping, and more. The time to check one's vote is when it is cast, not after the fact.The easiest--and still the best--way to vote is by paper. Physical, unchangeable proof. Easily watermarked/holographed for audit purposes. Lasts a long time. Requires no special software or hardware. Best of all--it's easy to trace at every step of the process.